To stem the flood of emails pointing out (rightly) that what I have written here, and previously, concerning ‘libertarianism’ bears no resemblance to what they understand as ‘libertarianism’, let me say that I am discussing a particular brand of American individualist-capitalist thought that some people there call ‘libertarian’ or even more mind-bogglingly ‘anarcho-capitalism’…
My post yesterday on Thirteen Things That Are Wrong With Libertarianism has been answered at length by one Rich Paul, a gentleman who calls himself a (the?) Radical Centrist. Responding to all of his post at once would become unwieldy, so I will be responding bit by bit.
I stated in my introduction to the article that:
Yes, right libertarianism (or more correctly, propertarianism) is becoming more popular with those in I.T. and the “new economy” types, but I, for one, am not impressed.
To which Mr. Paul responds:
There is nothing “Right Wing” about Libertarianism. Your confusion is probably brought about by a one dimensional political world view.
I have a couple of problems with that response. The first being that Mr. Paul knows exactly what I am saying when I say ‘right libertarianism’. He does the same thing in his article The Corporation when he writes “The Corporation, by Joel Bakan, is a left liberal rant with some interesting substance beneath it.” In taking pains to say “left liberal”, he is asserting that there is a liberal tradition other than that of Joel Bakan, and that it is not identified with the same characteristics that make Bakan’s “left”.
In my taking pains to say ‘right libertarianism’, I do the same, but since my doing so was raised as an objection to my article, I suppose I should explain it in a bit more detail. In 1857, seventeen years after Proudhon declared himself (in De l’être-humain mâle et femelle – Lettre à P.J. Proudhon par Joseph Déjacque) an anarchist, Joseph Déjacque coined the term libertarian to describe himself and his anarchist/communitarian ideals.
Given that anarchists are generally comfortable describing themselves as “the left wing of all socialisms”, and are explicitly anti-capitalist, I think that it is fair t, if there are two competing viewpoints both under the ‘flag’ of libertarianism, to call them the ‘left libertarians’ and for the sake of symmetry to call the other group ‘right libertarians’. Further basis for anarchists/libertarian socialists to be given the moniker ‘left libertarian’ is their critique of Marxism. They claim to be “left” of both the State and capitalism, so using the logic of the coiners of the term, any proponent of capitalism must be to the “right” of their position. The very recent, and geographically limited, use of the term ‘libertarian’ to connote a set of political/economic beliefs that embrace capitalism seems only to be confusing the issue.
My second point concerning Mr. Paul’s response is his assertion that I am somehow “confused” by my “one dimensional political worldview”. As I have shown above, there are sound reasons for the phrasing I employed, but I wish to address the”one dimensional” aspect of his response.
Libertarians, particularly those who are involved in the Libertarian Party, are fond of a quiz called the Nolan Test or the World’s Smallest Political Quiz. This quiz is incredibly simplistic, attempting to map all possible politics onto two axes. It is exceedingly obvious to anyone who has ever seen the quiz that it is an evangelistic tool, nothing more. It is an ideological litmus test; answer “yes to every question on it, and you become a macho “self governor” and are allowed to sneer disdainfully at anyone who would answer differently.
To have a link on your website to the most simplistic, two-dimensional political quiz going and then accuse someone else of being confused by their overly simplistic political world-view seems almost more comical than hypocritical.
As to the point Mr. Paul makes that:
Generally, propertarianism is used as a slur by socialists, though some Libertarians have, in the Yankee Doodle tradition, adopted the slur to negate it.
I think, within the context of anarchist thought that coined the term libertarianism, and given Mr. Paul’s own objection to my using the phrase ‘right libertarian’, that propertarian would be a imminently appropriate term to use to further distinguish property-based schools of thought calling themselves libertarians and social-justice based schools of thought calling themselves libertarian. I personally am much in favor of this line of demarcation; dispensing with left/right concepts entirely in favor of more descriptive, hence nuanced, terms. In broadest terms, we are, in this exchange between Mr. Paul and myself, discussing the differences between anarchist and propertarian schools of thought.
As to the Galbraith paraphrase, I wrote:
As J.K. Galbraith said, “…[the libertarian] is engaged in one of man’s oldest exercises in moral philosophy; that is, the search for a superior moral justification for selfishness”.
To which Mr. Paul responded:
Actually, what Galbraith said is “the modern conservative…” not “the libertarian…”. A conservative, like a (modern) liberal, is 90 degrees from libertarianism on the political compass. You might want to find an authority who actually criticized libertarianism for your next article.
I stand by my appropriation of Galbraith’s quote based on the main thrust of Galbraith’s work, which was that as societies become relatively more affluent, private business tends to eclipse the public sector, and due to a need of private business to create or manufacture consumer wants to sustain themselves, the public sector becomes neglected. His argument that in a system of free markets alone, private goods will be over provided and and public goods will be under provided, makes the application of his quote to anyone who argues for the primacy of free markets appropriate.
However, since he challenged me to “find an authority who actually criticized libertarianism”, here are three quotes for you:
Far from advocating a “minimal state”, we find it unquestionable that in an advanced society government ought to use its power of raising funds by taxation to provide a number of services which for various reasons cannot be provided or cannot be provided adequately by the market.
– Hayek, “Law, Legislation, and Liberty” 1982
There isn’t much point arguing about the word “libertarian.” It would make about as much sense to argue with an unreconstructed Stalinist about the word “democracy” — recall that they called what they’d constructed “peoples’ democracies.” The weird offshoot of ultra-right individualist anarchism that is called “libertarian” here happens to amount to advocacy of perhaps the worst kind of imaginable tyranny, namely unaccountable private tyranny. If they want to call that “libertarian,” fine; after all, Stalin called his system “democratic.” But why bother arguing about it?
– Noam ChomskyAn enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty… a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.
– Alexander Hamilton, FEDERALIST. No. 1
I ended my introduction to the article with:
Regardless of the morality of the thing, there are plenty of other reasons to dislike Libertarianism. Here are thirteen:
To which Mr. Paul’s response was:
Disregarding morality is normally unwise.
Then I will address it directly, though many of my arguments previously can be seen through an ethical lens as well. The morality of libertarianism is, in the words of Murray Rothbard, applying a universal human ethic to government. That sounds fantastic doesn’t it? Of course, treating a governmental system as if it were a human being is odd, sort of like the legal fiction of a corporation being a legal entity. Anthropomorphizing government doesn’t constitute a moral stance.
This position ignores a fundamental aspect of government; that it is us. Government is the expression of the collective ethos of a society, perhaps excepting totalitarian systems imposed against a resisting populace. As Robert Nozick pointed out in The Examined Life, “the libertarian view looked solely at the purpose of government, not at its meaning; hence, it took an unduly narrow view of purpose, too” (italics his).
A government is a way for a people to jointly and severally express and affirming their values. To remove every internal moral consideration from government and look only at, or restrict the functioning of it to, strictly utilitarian projects does keep the dissenter from being made an accomplice in some morally questionable activity, but denies the majority the option of affirming their position on the subject. This creates not a tyranny of the majority, as the libertarian canard goes, but a tyranny of the individual.
In a society with a minarchist government, particularly in the utopian versions of a privately run minarchy, there is no room for expressing ties of solidarity and mutual concern through any channel but privately owned ones, and who, owning such a channel, is going to allow it to be used in expressing views or positions contra his/her own?
Like the market, the state is an activity, not an entity. It is not somehow independent of the way of life that it forms a part of. That way of life, that society, revolves around work with all of its attendant structures of control and hierarchy.
John Hospers, elder statesman of the Libertarian Party in the US, sought to justify wage-labor, factory discipline and hierarchic management by noting that they’re imposed in Leninist regimes as well as under capitalism. He sees nothing demeaning in taking orders from bosses, for
“how else could a large scale factory be organized?”
Frederick Engels agrees:
“wanting to abolish authority in large-scale industry is tantamount to wanting to abolish industry itself.”
Some people giving orders and others obeying them: this is the essence of servitude. Of course, as Hospers smugly observes, “one can at least change jobs,” but you can’t avoid having a job — just as under statism one can at least change nationalities but you can’t avoid subjection to one nation-state or another. But freedom means more than the right to change masters.
Table of contents for Thirteen Things That Are Wrong With Libertarianism
- Thirteen Things That Are Wrong With Libertarianism
- Libertarianism Discussion: Introduction
- Libertarianism Discussion: Axiomatics
- Libertarianism Discussion: Initiation of Force
I have read both posts….Mr. Tillman makes some very intelligent arguements…Mr. Paul is very well versed in his brand of politics..Being that I am apolitical from the effect of tail-chasing and being involved in these types of discussions 20 years ago..I still love to read the “How We Can Change the World” hyperbole of the yet to be jaded.
You wrote”
“A government is a way for a people to jointly and severally express and affirming their values.”
What people? By what means is it expressed, and by what means are these values “affirmed”. If the local Avon lady wishes to “affirm” her values, people are free to deal with her or not. Things are a little different if a *government* decides to “affirm” its values. People get locked up or worse. I think the relevant distinction here is coercion, not “obedience” (which is morally neutral).
Any group of people who decide to have a government, obviously. The particular form or relative shape of a government has no bearing on this, except in extreme cases. A totalitarian state that does not allow emigration can be said to be coercive, being required to participate in the social contract in exchange for the goods of a society is not.
Lysander Spooner was wrong in his critique of Rousseau, in his claim that a “social contract” cannot be used to justify governmental actions such as taxation, because government will initiate force against anyone who does not wish to enter into such a contract. I hope I have made it clear that I am focusing on the philosophical bases of these ideas, but I will make it explicit that I am not speaking of juridical contract theory, but of a Madisonian “compact”. Understanding that Rousseau was not speaking of a juridical “contract” makes Spooner’s argument a non sequitur.
A social contract is a set of ‘house rules’: an individual consents and affirms their commitment to the social contract by entering or remaining within the dominion of an existing society, normally a geographic area.
If you disagree with the social contract as expressed through government, or any other organ of society for that matter, you have (at least) five choices:
1) Tolerate and accept the social contract
2) Try to amend it or change it
3) Leave it by emigrating
4) Violate it
5) Revolt against it
You make a number of points worth touching on. Perhaps the most fundamental has to do with your explanation of a “social compact”.
“A social contract is a set of ‘house rules’: an individual consents and affirms their commitment to the social contract by entering or remaining within the dominion of an existing society, normally a geographic area.”
Inherent in this arrangement, whether you call it a compact or contract, is the notion of ownership or property. Ownership entails the right of use and disposal. One has the right to enter or remain on ones property under the conditions set by the owner. Or, property purchased jointly by two or more individuals can be used by each member according to the rules set by and agreed upon by each member of the group. However (and this is the real thrust of Spooners argument), a state, or government, *claims* an enforceable jurisdiction that does not originate or arise from any kind of voluntary arrangement, but from coercion.
In this viewpoint, one would have to assume, for example, that the American State is the “owner” of all that exists or resides within its claimed borders (and all those living within are tenants). I don’t see how this can be justified within either framework that you mention. Moreover, it makes little sense to speak of the boundaries or “dominion” of a society, since a “society” has no specific borders or cultural boundaries that one can define or demarcate. Where one type of civilization ends and another one begins can be defined approximately at best, whereas political borders are at any given time, specific.
Thus, anarcho-capitalism (if you will), assumes there is no way to establish the legitimacy of the state through individual voluntary consent.
Having looked at your original article on libertarianism, however, I can see our disagreement runs much deeper than the points discussed so far.
Tim Hopkins
A few points on your rejoinder:
First, it does not necessarily follow that all forms of land control imply disposal rights, but yes, I am speaking of severally owned property when I talk of the territory or dominion of a government.
It also does not do to anthropomorphize government for the sake of argument. A State does not claim anything. The people who make up that State claim things through the collective identity of the State.
If it is not necessary to anthropomorphize government, then it is unnecessary to see the State itself as owner of anything. In that any claim is made, it is the claim of the (majority of the) people residing in a specific location that they severally control some piece of land and those on that piece of land must play by the rules.
As to your assertion that right-libertarianism (anarcho-capitalism is too silly a contradiction in terms to use in any serious context) assumes that there is no way to establish the legitimacy of the state through individual voluntary consent:
There are many ways to establish the legitimacy of a State. The first and most obvious can be found in almost all political writing, including that of minarchists and right-libertarians. Asking which issues are justified tasks for the apparatus of a state cannot legitimize the state per se, but does imply already answering “yes” to the question “is the state legitimate?”
But the most basic form of State legitimacy is, and always will be, popular acceptance of the States existence. I would be interested in reading how one comes to the conclusion that ‘individual voluntary consent’ is somehow different from the idea of ‘popular acceptance’.
Backing up a bit; I don’t see how you derive the right to control in a way that is different than the right of use and disposal, the essence of ownership. How does an institution obtain rights that are not possessed, and are not reducible, to the rights of individuals? If there is “control by a popular majority”, there can be no ownership in the same respect. So what we are talking about here is the “right” to use coercion (invested in the state), which is precisely what requires a justification. The implication here is that groups have rights, people do not. This, of course, is consistent with your view (from your original article) that rights emerge from the state (qua institution), or society.
On the distinction between individual voluntary consent and popular acceptance, the former provides an (allegedly) moral justification for the state, the latter offers a sociological observation. Physical torture of political dissidents may be supported by popular acceptance, but it can hardly be reconciled with individual voluntary consent, in that the subjects of this torture are not “consenting”.
Tim
Firstly, property is, in my view, not a relationship between people and things, but a relationship between people with regard to things.
Secondly, what I said was that it does not necessarily follow that all forms of land control imply disposal rights. Only Sovereignty demands the right of disposal. Modern views of ownership usually signify a bundle of “property rights” but do not necessarily demand them. It is relatively common to write a real estate contract with a member of ones family that restricts the right to dispose of the property to a specific individual or class (other family members). If you take an ultra-strict view of ownership, then the person in possession of that deed does not own that property. Perhaps I should have simply rephrased that to read “it does not necessarily follow that all forms of land control imply absolute rights to that property.”
As to your second point, I believe that popular acceptance of something like torture of dissidents, within a country which has no barriers to emigration, does indeed point towards collective voluntary consent, if not individual voluntary consent in all those who do not actively oppose it. Mere private disapproval does not constitute dissent.
Additionally, it is intellectually dishonest in the extreme to attempt to conflate the torture of political dissidents with any sort of demand for someone to uphold the terms of a social contract, such as tax-paying.
I’m not familiar with the type of real estate contracts you refer to. My initial impression though, is that an exchange of property titles, if the acquisition involved a set of conditions as to how it was used, would indeed not be ownership at all, but a rental agreement, with the *real owner* determining the limits. Perhaps I am misunderstanding. EG: I give my daughter a watch, but she has to agree to wear it on her right wrist and never her left. She agrees but is found wearing it on her left wrist, so I take it away from her. One can state that the watch was gifted, plain and simple, and the promise to wear it on her right wrist was unenforceable (though perhaps morally obligatory). Or one can say I never actually alienated ownership of the watch, which, I think would prove to be problematic at best. Either she now owns the watch or I do.
The comment about the torture of dissidents was simply intended as a demonstration of the fact that “popular acceptance” is insufficient justification for aggression by the state. Similarly, popular acceptance by itself if immaterial as a basis for ascribing legitimacy to the state itself. On what basis would you label torture (involuntary) a crime but the payment of taxes a function of the “social contract”? If a “social contract/compact” is to be an effective criteria, it would be helpful to know:
1. Who are the individuals who allegedly comprise this “compact”?
2. How do they obtain rights that are denied to other, dissenting individuals?
3. If members of the compact can impose their will on those living within their “territory”, why not (since there is no strict “property” or “ownership”) on those outside; ie: a compact that imposes taxes to be paid by every person over 6 feet tall, regardless of location? Is territorial sovereignty a moral principle or a pragmatic compromise?
I think you are misunderstanding, perhaps I can explain it better. If a member of my extended family owns a piece of property, the proverbial ‘family homestead’, and wishes to sell it to me, but ensure that it will be kept it in the family, it is trivial to write a real estate contract that causes title and deed to that piece of land to be transferred to me but which restricts my right of disposal to a select group of persons (other members of my extended family). Does that make more sense?
To bring the second set of your questions back to the topic at hand, my intention is to show that in the actually existing United States, you cannot conflate tax paying with illegal torture of dissidents, and any attempt to do so is well and truly a case of intellectual dishonesty. Tax paying in the US is a function of social contract, one which you as an individual are welcome to opt out of at any time by vacating the territory of the contract.
My question to you, and to libertarianism in general, is; if you can consider demands for tax-paying to be morally no different than detention and torture, how can you except rent-seeking or contract enforcement from this moral category? Any demand for tax-paying is based on a concept of property and sovereignty over that property. I fail to see how enforcement of contracts or enforcement of personal property rights in any way differs from demands for tax-paying.
The only logically consistent position that I can see is that personal property can only be singly owned, but not severally, allowing an individual to enforce rules or seek rents but not a corporate body such as a government to do so.
No, actually he is not well versed at all in the rhetoric of libertarianism. He is very good at parroting the evangelistic talking points from “Libertarianism In One Lesson”.
His rejoinder to my list was almost entirely either non-responsive to the issues I raised or minimally responsive while attempting to change the subject back to the narrow focus necessary for right-libertarian rhetoric to make even a modicum of sense.
The example of the torture of political prisoners was just that, an example. Although it shares the same fundamental features in common, it is admittedly a different, more overt, form of agression than taxation.
In referring once again to the “social contract” you say that one can “opt out” at any time by leaving the territory of the contract. I see two problems here, both of which I am sure you will think is indicative of an overly restrictive concept of “contract”.
By claiming that one can “opt out” of the social contract, here you seem to be assuming the very point you are trying to establish. it is difficult to concieve of a way to opt out of something you never “opted into” in the first place.
My second observation concerns your peculiar phrase “the territory of the contract”. Contracts pertain primarily to individuals, not geography. If, A, B, C, E and F form an association for the mutual use of their land and property, it is the property of these individuals, and the fact that they have established an agreement amongst themselves, that sets the parameters, or “jurisdiction”, if you will, of the contract. Now, consider “D”, who is not part of this pact and who is a sovereign individual? What would it mean for A, B, C, E and F to inform this hapless fellow that he is within the “territory of their contract”?
Finally, you write that you cannot see how enforcement of property rights is any different than the requirement to pay taxes. I trust you are not really suggesting that the policeman and the armed robber are on the same team.
Tim
At this point, I am going to have to insist that you either respond to what I have actually written or stop commenting here.
If, instead of rearranging my statements, taking them out of context or simply ignoring the bits you don’t want to deal with, you can reply directly to what I have written, I will be happy to continue the discussion.
Any further comments that do not follow this advice will be summarily deleted.
I am unclear as to what you are driving at.
Let us assume that you are living on an ungoverned island. I live on one side of you, and Fred lives on the other. We three form the entire population of the Island. One day, Fred and I are attempting to figure out a way to live without working. We decide to form a government, which can be defined as “that institution through which everyone attempts to live at the expense of everyone else”. We knock on your door, and inform you that we have been so kind as to form a government to “help” you decide how to live. We are having an election now, and we two have agreed that I should be President and he should be Vice-President. However, it is good form to let you, our fellow citizen, vote as well. The outcome is assured. Your choices, we say, are to agree to be taxed in order to support us, or to swim for it.
Are Fred and I within our rights? If not, by what theory have we coerced you, since you do retain the right to flee?
On “right” and “left” wings:
The right wing, in general, permits economic freedom, but does not permit individuals to make personal lifestyle choices.
The left wing, in general, permits no economic freedom, but does permit individuals to make personal lifestyle choices.
Libertarianism, in general, permits economic freedom, and does permit individuals to make personal lifestyle choices.
Thus I continue to assert that Libertarianism (capitalized to emphasize that it is Libertarianism as defined by the Libertarian Party) is, indeed, a centrist system. This matters to me because once upon a time, when Adam Smith, J.S.Mill, Lord Acton, and others were beginning to define Libertarianism, they called it Liberalism. This word continued to imply capitalism (a.k.a economic freedom) as well as religious tolerance until the 20th century, when the Socialists decided that the first thing they would redistribute would be the label “Liberal”, which they redistributed to themselves. Once they redistributed our word, we had no label, and eventually settled on Libertarianism as a replacement. Some Libertarians, for example Milton Freedman, continued to use the word Liberal, but modified it to “Classic Liberal”. This is an acceptable substitute. The problem with “Right Libertarian” is that a “Right Libertarian” would be one who believed in complete economic freedom, but limited personal freedom: too much personal freedom to be called a conservative, but too little to be in the center of the Libertarian camp.
When I use the term “left liberal”, it is to differentiate it from “classical liberals” like Milton Freedman, Adam Smith, J.S.Mill, and others. This is a very different Liberal tradition. As a matter of fact, it is Libertarianism.
All of the anarchists I know are opposed to all government. Socialism requires that the state redistribute wealth from those who have earned it to those who have not. Since there would be no state to do this in an anarchist society, I’m not sure how it is possible to have anarchy which was somehow socialist at the same time. In the absence of all government, the result would be capitalism: that is, you own what you create. The main difference is that you would have to enforce your own property rights, so you had better be well armed if you want to create anything without having it stolen. Anarcho-capitalists are really just consistent anarchists.
It is, indeed simplistic. It only has two axes. Simplistic, however, is a
relative term. It is surely more sophistacated then the one axis system
in common use, which causes leftists to conclude that Libertarians are
right-wing because we are not Socialists, and rightists to conclude that
Liberatarians are left-wing because we are neither Theocrats nor Imperialists.
As for sneering, I have noticed that non-Libertarians on both the left and
right are no less disdainful of us as we are of them, and with less reason:
we would not impose anything upon them, we would just remove from them the
“right” to manage our lives. And though they may have a legal right to do so,
they can never have a moral right to do so, any more then the laws of Germany
gave Hitler the “right” to kill Jews.
Again, two axes are more simplistic than any other possibility. Except one
axis, that is. Do you know of a three (or more) dimentional scale which would
be an even more sophisticated measure? I’m all for it.
I would not accept the assumption that no anarchists accept the legitimacy of
private property. Even if they did, who exactly would be responsible for
confiscating your cloths, books, and baby pictures in an anarchist society?
The government?
I do not know the context, only the quote. Perhaps he *meant* all people who
perfer a free market economy to a command and control economy.
It is not a matter of anthropomorphizing government. The statist school of
thought believes that when a group of people declare themselves to be ‘a
government’, they magically obtain new and extensive rights as a group which
none of them ever had as individuals. I, on the other hand, would argue that
the rights of a group are exactly the sum of the rights of it’s members. If
none of the individuals in the group have a right to rob me, then how can it
be said that the group as a whole has a right to tax me?
Except that I am not one of the us which it is. Good god, I’ve never even
voted for a winning candidate! So what we’re down to is that it’s ok for two
wolves and a lamb to vote for what to have for dinner, so long as they say to
the lamb “don’t feel bad, you’re one of us!”
Except that the majority is nothing but a group of individuals. If each one
of them wants to put up a sign that “affirms” their feeling on an issue, then
I suppose I’ll have to look at the signs. Their property, their issue. But I
am also free to ignore their affirmation, if I do not share their values.
Well, for one, you are doing that right now. You own the “channel” of your
blog. I am expressing views or positions that are contrary to yours. I
expect that you will leave this reply in place. If you choose not to,
however, I can go back to my blog, which is my privately owned channel, and
post it there. It is little problem that these channels are privately owned,
since anybody can have one. It is governments that create things like the FCC
to limit expression to that which is “politically acceptable”. Nobody else
has the power.
The difference between the “orders” you get from your employer (if you have
one) and those you get from government is the difference between a carrot and
a stick. Your employer cannot harm you for refusing an “order”. The
government regularly harms people that refuse it’s orders. Because of this,
an employer must “make it worth your while” to follow his orders by paying
you. The government does not need to do so, it can just torture, kill, or
imprison you if you ignore it’s orders.
There is also no requirement that everyone have an employer. Of course you
need to gather resources to meet your needs, but there are many ways to do
that without having a job. Anyone who can provide anything of value to anyone
can “be his own boss” just by selling his service directly to those who need
it. If even that is too “hierarchic” for you, since in order to be paid you
would need to provide something which people actually value, you can always go
off and hunt, gather, or farm to meet your needs. It is not guaranteed that
you will make a good living this way, and many people will take jobs because
they find that they can provide themselves with a better lifestyle that way,
but there is no requirement that you take a job.
I disagree with Hospers that there is no other way to organize an industry
then through a top-down management approach. If people want to form co-ops
and run a business “democraticly”, they have every right to do so. It may or
may not be efficient, but if that is what they want, nobody in a Libertarian
society would have any right to stop them. Their success would be limited
only by the laws of nature, which Libertarians, unlike Statists, are not
trying to repeal.
There is just so much wrong with this comment. Let me number them in order to facilitate further rejoinders:
0) You presupposes no externalities for the island? It is a world unto itself, with no outside authority or higher recourse? I am willing to accept the premise for the sake of discussion, but it ought to be made explicit.
If so;
1) You, Fred and I constitute a government prior to you and Fred deciding to call your joint agreement a government. Ignoring that seems silly. We make up the totality of the society of our island, and as such, all rights, responsibilities and laws flow from us.
2) You provide no basis for comparison between the ad hoc agreements between the three of us that constituted that ‘government’, or ‘compact’ if you prefer. Thus it is impossible for anyone to know in what way the new You/Fred agreement is in opposition to the existing social order.
3) You spectacularly betray your bias with the phrase “…government, which can be defined as ‘that institution through which everyone attempts to live at the expense of everyone else’.” That does not however, change the fundamental question;
4) You ask if you and Fred are within your “rights”, which presupposes some mythical set of “rights” that exist on our island somehow without you, Fred or I being there to exercise them. As Jeremy Bentham said, this concept of “natural rights” is “…nonsense upon stilts”.
5) None of this changes the basic choices I have in that situation:
a) Tolerate and accept the social contract
b) Try to amend it or change it
c) Leave it by emigrating
d) Violate it
e) Revolt against it
My decision will no doubt be based on quite a few factors, including my perception of the intention of You and Fred, my willingness to work with or for you as the case may be, the value I place on you and Fred as the totality of my society, relative levels of coercive potential (who is better armed or better able to make use of those arms), and my prospects for a similar or better lifestyle by emigrating.